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affirmative governmental action in protecting and advancing his constitutional rights, will need to be clarified in the future.

Amanda M. Shaw

GIFT AND ESTATE TAX INTEREST-FREE LOANS INTRAFAMILY INTEREST-FREE LOANS ARE NOT TAXABLE TRANSFERS FOR

FEDERAL

PURPOSES OF I.R.C. § 2501. Crown v. Commissioner, (T.C. 1977).
A gift tax deficiency' was assessed against the taxpayer, Lester Crown,
as a result of certain interest-free loans extended by a partnership, 2 in which
he had a one-third interest, to twenty-four trusts. 3 The trusts involved were
4
created for the benefit of the children and other relatives of the partners.
Loans in excess of eighteen million dollars 5 were executed as either demand
notes or as loans with fixed maturity dates. 6 The Internal Revenue Service
(Service), relying on an earlier Revenue Ruling,7 determined that the loans
constituted gifts to the borrowers to the extent of the value of the use of the
money loaned. 8 In computing this value, the Service utilized an interest rate
1. Section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on the transfer of
property by gift. I.R.C. § 2501. The statute is comprehensive in nature and I.R.C.
§ 2511 provides:
Subject to the limitations contained in this chapter, the tax imposed by section
2501 shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is
direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible, but in the case of a nonresident not a citizen of the United States,
shall apply to a transfer only if the property is situated within the United States.
I.R.C. § 2511(a). The regulations provide:
The tax applies to all transfers by gift of property, wherever situated, by an
individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States, to the extent the
value of the transfers exceeds the amount of the exclusions authorized by section
2503 and the deductions authorized by sections 2521, 2522, and 2523.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2501-1(a)(1), T.D. 7296, 1974-1 C.B. 255.
2. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060, 1061 (1977). The partnership, the
Areljay Company, was an Illinois general partnership formed in 1944. Id. at 1060. The
three equal partners were the petitioner and his two brothers. Id.
3. Id. at 1060-61.
4. Id. at 1061.
5. Id. The loans were created at various times. Id. Prior to January 3, 1967, the
majority of loans recorded were noninterest bearing demand notes aggregating
$2,262,574. Id. However, on that date, separate open account loans totalling
$15,960,000 were made to the 24 trusts. Id. The loans outstanding at the end of 1967
consisted of $2,073,649 in demand notes and $15,956,375 on open account. Id. While
the open account loans had no provision with respect to interest, all of the demand
notes provided for interest at six percent per annum after demand. Id.
6. Id. A demand obligation is the use of capital at the will of the lender, which
may be recalled at any point in time. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 517 (4th ed. 1951).
7. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408. See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text
infra.
8. 67 T.C. at 1062.
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of six percent per annum. 9 The Tax Court entered a decision for the
taxpayer, holding that since the principal of the loan would not escape
taxation in the taxpayer's estate at the time of his death and since the
subjection of intrafamily sharing of property to the gift tax laws would
create severe administrative problems, the gift tax would not be applied to
intrafamily interest-free loans. Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
The congressional purpose underlying the imposition of the gift tax
provisions was to tax all inter vivos transactions which operated to pass
property for less than an adequate and full consideration. 10 The Supreme
Court has emphasized that the congressional intent was to control the
passage of the economic benefits in property for which full value had not
been received.1 Under the Internal Revenue Code (Code), the three requirements for imposition of the gift tax 12 are simply a transfer 3 of property 4
9. Id. at 1061. The Service calculated the rate of interest at six percent, based
upon market factors involving arm's-length transactions. Id. The interest computed
on the total indebtedness amounted to $1,086,407.75 and one-third of this amount
($362,135.92) was attributed to the petitioner as a result of his interest in the
partnership. Id. at 1061-62. The Service presented no evidence as to why it deemed a
six percent interest rate proper, though it was presumably used because it is the rate
utilized by the regulations for valuing annuities and life estates created during 1971 or
afterwards. Treas. Reg. §25.2512-9 (1977). One commentator has stated that in
certain situations it is unrealistic to value demand notes and fixed maturity
indebtedness in the same manner. See E. HELFERT, TECHNIQUES OF FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS 127-45 (1972). Market analysis indicates that the value of the right to use
money on a demand basis is less than the right to use the same amount of money for
a fixed time period. Id. at 137-38. This difference results from the inability to calculate
the present value of demand obligations since it is not known how long the debt will
be outstanding; the amount of such discount will increase in proportion to the amount
of time the demand loans remain unpaid. Id. at 129-30.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1932).
11. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); Merrill v. Fahs, 324
U.S. 308 (1945); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943); Estate of Sanford v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). The Supreme Court has addressed the purposes
underlying the gift tax and stated that the tax is in pari materia with the estate tax.
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933). Additionally, it has been stated that
"the purpose of the gift tax is to complement the estate tax by preventing tax-free
depletion of the transferor's estate during his lifetime." Harris v. Commissioner, 340
U.S. 106, 107 (1950). By use of the gift tax, Congress intended "to hit all the protean
arrangements which the wit of man can devise that are not business transactions."
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. at 306.
12. See I.R.C. § 2501; note 1 supra. See also Note, The Value of the Use of Money
Loaned by Taxpayers to Their Children Without Interest Does Not Constitute a Gift, 5
Hous. L. REV. 138 (1967).
13. See Treas. Regs. §25.2511-1 to 3, T.D. 7296, 1974-1 C.B. 255. A transfer is
complete as to "any property, or part thereof or interest therein, of which the donor
has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change its
disposition, whether for his own benefit or for the benefit of another." Treas. Reg.
25.2511-2(b), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544.
14. It has been stated that "any object is property, and... the right to use an
object is property." Note, supra note 12, at 139. Property has been defined "to denote
everything which is the subject of ownership, corporael or incorporael, tangible or
intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable
value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of
valuable right and interest ...." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1951). The
committee reports relating to § 2511 of the Code stated that "[t]he terms 'property',
'transfer', 'gift' and 'indirectly' are used in the broadest and most comprehensive
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for less than adequate monetary consideration.15 In Commissioner
v. Wemyss, 16 the Supreme Court determined that absence of donative intent
did not preclude a finding that the transfer of stock by an individual to his
prospective wife for less than adequate monetary consideration was a gift
17
for purposes of the gift tax.
In the 1953 case of Gertrude H. Blackburn,1s the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (Commissioner) successfully maintained that between
family members, the right to the use of money at less than a fair market rate
of return constituted a gift for gift tax purposes.' 9 In Blackburn, the
taxpayer transferred a building to her children, taking in return a note
bearing interest well below the market rate. 2° The Tax Court determined a
portion of the transaction to be a gift and a portion to be a sale and
concluded that a taxable gift2l existed to the extent of the difference between
the fair market value of the property and the fair market value of the note at
22
time of transfer.

sense; the term 'property' reaching every species of right or interest protected by law
and having an exchangeable value." H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932);
S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932). See I.R.C. § 2511.
15. While the estate and gift tax laws are not always correlated, the phrase
"adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" has been held to have
the same interpretation under both subtitles. Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945). The
Treasury Regulations under § 2043 provide that "[t]o constitute a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, the transfer must have
been made in good faith, and the price must have been an adequate and full
equivalent reducible to a money value." Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(a) (1977). In addition,
another regulation provides:
Transfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those only which, being
without a valuable consideration, accord with the common law concept of gifts,
but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property for a
consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by the
donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration given
therefor.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1977). See also Note, supra note 12, at 140.
16. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
17. Id. at 306, 308. Common law criteria of consideration, such as a promise to
marry, were found equally irrelevant to the imposition of the gift tax. Id. at 305-06.
Donative intent may be relevant in a bona fide business transaction where one party
has made a bad bargain. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(g)(1), T.D. 7296, 1974-1 C.B. 255.
However, no genuine business transaction in which a party receives less than
adequate consideration comes within the purview of gift tax. Id. § 25.2512-8, T.D.
6334, 1958-2 C.B. 627.
18. 20 T.C. 204 (1952).
19. Id. at 207.
20. Id. The parties stipulated the value of the real estate transferred to be $245,000
on the open market. Id. at 204. The record indicated that, while the note involved bore
interest at the rate of 2.25% per annum, the market rate of interest on a similarly
secured note would be 4% per annum. Id. at 207.
21. A "taxable gift" is defined under the regulations as the total amount of gifts
made by the donor during a calendar quarter less certain deductions. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2503-1, T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544. The "total amount of gifts" is also defined by
the regulations as "the sum of the values of the gifts made during the calendar
quarter." Id.
22. 20 T.C. at 207.
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Thirteen years later, in Johnson v. United States, 23 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas apparently disagreed with
the Tax Court in Blackburn by holding that no gift tax should be imposed
upon intrafamily interest-free demand loans. 24 In Johnson, substantial
25
interest-free loans had been made by taxpayer parents to their children
26
over a period of eleven years. At all relevant times the records and books of
the parents indicated that a few gifts had been made, but the postings
showed that the advances in question were bona fide interest-free loans,
payable upon demand. 27 The Johnson court based its holding on the
rationale that the principal of an interest-free loan would be included in the
lender's gross estate and that, unlike a gift, the loan would not operate to
reduce the estate tax realizable at death. 28 The Commissioner never
appealed the decision in Johnson and never indicated his nonacquiescence
to the holding. However, in Revenue Ruling 73-61,29 commenting on an
interest-free loan from a father to his son's closely held corporation, the
Service took a position detrimental to the taxpayer and reiterated its
assertion that the making of noninterest bearing loans constituted a taxable
event. 30
In contrast to the small number of cases that focus on the gift tax
consequences flowing from the grant of interest-free loans,"1 the income tax
consequences resulting from such loans have been widely litigated. 32 In J.
Simpson Dean,33 the Tax Court was confronted with a case in which a
closely held corporation had made substantial loans to its shareholders on

23.
24.
25.
26.

254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.

27. Id.

28. Id. at 77. The Johnson court relied heavily upon Harris v. Commissioner, 340

U.S. 106 (1950), and viewed the gift tax as a measure to prevent the evasion of estate
taxes. 254 F. Supp. at 77. See note 11 supra.
29. Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
30. Id. at 409. In this ruling, the father had loaned $250,000 to his son's closely
held corporation. Id. at 408. The Service adopted the following position:
The right to use property, in this case money, is itself an interest in property, the
transfer of which is a gift within the purview of section 2501 of the Code unless
full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth is received. The tax
in the instant case would be imposed on the value of the right to use the money.
Such value is usually stated in terms of interest or some other equivalent in
money or money's worth. The rate of interest that would represent full and
adequate consideration may vary, depending upon the actual circumstances
pertaining to the transaction.
Id. at 409 (citation omitted). The ruling was limited however, by the Service's
statement that it would not be applicable in cases involving transfers falling within
the purview of the annual exclusion. Id.
31. See notes 18-30 and accompanying text supra.
32. See notes 33-45 and accompanying text infra.
33. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), nonacq. 1973-2 C.B. 4. It is interesting to note that the
Government did not appeal the decision and that it waited 12 years to indicate it's
nonacquiescence. 1973-2 C.B. 4. For additional commentary on Dean, see Wilkes, Tax
Court Holds Interest-Free Loans to Shareholder Creates No Taxable Income, 14 J.
Tax. 351 (1961).
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an interest-free basis.3 4 The Commissioner argued that the value of the use
of such funds was equal to the interest that could have been earned at the
prime rate and that the shareholder taxpayers had realized income to the
extent of that interest. 35 The Dean court ruled against the Commissioner,
holding that the borrowers did not realize income from the interest-free
corporate loans because the imputed interest would have entitled the
taxpayers to a corresponding income tax deduction, 36 thus cancelling out
any income. 37 The court never addressed the argument presented by the
dissent which suggested placing the burden on taxpayers to prove that if
they did in fact have an obligation to pay interest, they would have been
entitled to deduct the interest from their gross income. 38 The principle that
income will not be imputed to parties who do not actually receive it was
upheld in the income tax case of Combs Lumber Co. v. Commissioner.39 In

that case, the court held that no interest income could be imputed to a
borrower/shareholder lent money by a closely held corporation since the
parties intended that no interest was to be charged.40 In dealing with loans
transacted between a parent corporation and a subsidiary, the Tax Court in
Smith-Bridgeman & Co. 41 held that no improper shifting of funds existed
because the statute involved 42 did not authorize the creation of income where
neither party, in fact, had realized income. 43 This position has recently
undergone reevaluation by the Second Circuit in B. Foreman Co. v.
Commissioner.44 In Foreman, the court held that the transaction of an
4
interest-free loan between related entities was subject to section 482. 1
34. 35 T.C. at 1083.
35. Id. at 1087.

36. I.R.C. § 163.
37. 35 T.C. at 1090.
38. Id. at 1092 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
39. 41 B.T.A. 339, 343 (1940).
40. Id. at 343. The lack of intent to charge interest was evidenced by the failure of
the lender corporation to accrue interest and the failure of the borrower shareholders
to deduct interest on their respective books. Id.
41. 16 T.C. 287 (1951).

42. I.R.C. § 45.
43. 16 T.C. at 294. See, e.g., Kahler Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 496 (1972),
nonacq. 1972-2 C.B. 3, 5; Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 479 (1972), nonacq.

1972-2 C.B. 3, 5; PPG Indus., Inc. 55 T.C. 928 (1970). See also Seghers, The Recent
PPG Case: Is it a Blueprint to Balance the IRS's 482 Allocation Powers?, 34 J. OF TAX.
370 (1971).
44. 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972).
45. Id. at 1147. See note 87 infra. See also Crawford, Are the Courts Expanding
the Scope of Code Section 482?, 36 J. OF TAX. 150 (1972); Nauheim, B. Foreman& Co.,
Inc. - A Crucial Test of the Future of Section 482, 26 TAX LAw. 107 (1972).

In other contexts, courts have taken conflicting viewpoints as to the taxable
effect of certain transactions. In Mason v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975),
the Seventh Circuit held that the value forgone by a taxpayer in a transaction with a

charity was allowable as an income tax deduction. Id. at 29. For a discussion of
Mason and the probable impact thereof, see Duhl & Fine, New Case Allowing Interest
Deduction Calls for Reappraisalof No-Interest Loans, 44 J. OF TAX. 34 (1976). See also
Linett, Tax Trends - Sec. 482: Interest Income "created" on Interest-Free Loans CA-5 joins CA-2, CA-8, CA-9 v. TC, 6 TAX ADIVSOR 380 (1975).
An interest-free loan has been held not to constitute additional compensation
for income tax purposes in a real estate transaction amongst partners. Saunders v.
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In evaluating the taxability of interest-free loans, the Tax Court 46 in
Crown noted that only recently had the Service asserted that the existence
of these loans created a taxable event, 47 even though "the statutory
authorities offered in support of [the Service's] position have been in
existence since the creation of our income and gift tax laws. '48 Since the
issue sub judice was being considered by the Tax Court for the first time, the
49
court referred to income tax as well as gift tax precedents.
The Crown court determined that the gift tax need not be applied in the
instant situation because the transaction involved herein would not act as a
5
vehicle to avoid the estate tax. 0 In so doing, the court applied the rationale
articulated in Johnson - since the outstanding indebtedness would be
included in the lender's gross estate at death, the taxpayer would not
51
Furthermore, addressing the
circumvent the estate tax provisions.

argument that the lender's gross estate was effectively diminished as a
result of the foregone interest, the court stated that no affirmative obligation
52

exists which requires a taxpayer to invest his money.

In the absence of express congressional mandate, the Tax Court refused
to subject intrafamily interest-free loans to the gift tax.

53

The court, referring

to the promulgation of regulations under section 482 of the Code, 54 noted the
United States, 294 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (D. Haw. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 450
F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971). Recently, the decision in Joseph Lupowitz Sons v.
Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974), upheld the doctrine that interest-free
transfers betwen two related corporations will not result in a constructive dividend
being taxed to the shareholders solely by the existence of common ownership between
the transacting corporations. Id. at 868.
46. Chief Judge Dawson wrote the majority opinion. Judge Simpson, joined by
Judge Raum, Judge Tannenwald and Judge Wilber, wrote the dissenting opinion.
Judges Drennen, Quealy and Hall did not participate.
47. 67 T.C. at 1063.
48. Id. at 1067. It is interesting to note that the majority made this assertion
without discussing the 1953 Tax Court decision in Gertrude H. Blackburn, 20 T.C. 204
(1953). In that case, the Service assessed a gift tax deficiency against the taxpayer as
the result of a sale of property to her children secured by a note well below market
interest rates. Id. at 207. For a discussion of Blackburn, see notes 18-22 and
accompanying text supra.
49. 67 T.C. at 1062, 1064. See also note 45 supra.
50. 67 T.C. at 1063-64. The court's position is apparently premised on the fact
that the outstanding note, held by the lender, would be classified as § 2033 property
and therefore included within the lender's gross estate at its fair market value on date
of death or on the alternate valuation date. See I.R.C. § 2033. In general, "It]he gross
estate of a decedent . . . includes . . . the value of all property, whether real or
personal, tangible or intangible, and wherever situated, beneficially owned by the
decedent at the time of his death." Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a), T.D. 6684, 1963-2 C.B.
411.
51. 67 T.C. at 1063. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text supra. One
commentator has. stated that Johnson was an important decision in "its realization
that since the principal of the loans would remain in the lender's estate at death,
nothing ... permitted the lender to avoid future estate taxes by reducing his current
estate by means of inter vivos gifts of principal." Linett, Interest-Free Loans to
Relatives Not Subject to Gift Tax, 8 TAX ADvISOR 371, 372 (1977).
52. 67 T.C. at 1063-64.
53. Id. at 1064.
54. Id. See note 87 infra. The court made reference to this section to support its
position that the legislature, not the courts, should cause the making of a noninterestbearing loan to be a taxable event. 67 T.C. at 1064.
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traditional position of the judiciary not to subject noninterest bearing
instruments to the income tax or gift tax provisions. 55 Finally, the court
recognized that without adequate congressional guidelines, the taxing of
56
intrafamily sharing of property would be administratively unmanageable.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Simpson strongly disagreed with the
majority's holding. 57 The dissent evaluated the congressional intentions
behind the enactment of section 2511 and determined that, although no
specific mention was made of interest-free loans within the statute or
committee reports, the expansive language of the statute and regulations
implicitly incorporated the right to use money as a property interest.5 8
Accordingly, since a property interest was transferred for "less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, ' 59 Judge
Simpson believed that a gift tax should be imposed. 60 Additionally, the
dissent asserted that an application of the Wemyss interpretation of "gift"
mandated a result contrary to that reached by the majority.6 1 Judge
Simpson, relying on Blackburn, then valued the gift as the difference
between the face value of the notes and their discounted values at the
62
prevailing rate of interest.
55. 67 T.C. at 1064.
56. Id. at 1065. The court appeard to be considerably swayed by the administrative practicalities of imposing the gift tax and the majority implied that a strictly
academic interpretation of the gift tax provisions would produce a contrary result. Id.
The court stated: 'Thus, we are inclined to follow in this area Justice Holmes'
admonition that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic.'" Id. (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 1065-70 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1066 (Simpson, J., dissenting). In discussing the valuation of transfers,
the regulations speak in terms of valuing property:
Transfers for insufficient consideration. Transfers reached by the gift tax are not
confined to those only which, being without a valuable consideration, accord
with the common law concept of gifts, but embrace as well sales, exchanges, and
other dispositions of property for a consideration to the extent that the value of
the property transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or money's
worth of the consideration given therefor. However, a sale, exchange, or other
transfer of property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which
is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent) will be
considered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth. A consideration not reducible to a value in money or money's worth, as
love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the
entire value of the property transferred constitutes the amount of the gift.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1977). It is suggested that the attempt by the Treasury to
reduce "sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property" to a specific monetary
value may reflect an implicit understanding that property equals money or money's
worth. See note 15 supra.
59. 67 T.C. at 1061. See I.R.C. § 2512(b).
60. 67 T.C. at 1066-67 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
61. 67 T.C. at 1067 (Simpson, J., dissenting). See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying
text supra.
62. 67 T.C. at 1068 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). It is suggested that
the technique asserted by the dissent as the proper method of valuation of property
exchanged is consistent with congressional intent as well as in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Treasury Regulations. The regulations provided that
"[tihe value of the property [transferred] is the price at which such property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant
facts." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367. The rate of return utilized
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As an alternative argument, the dissent analogized to the charitable
63
deduction permitted in the income tax area for the free use of property.
Judge Simpson reasoned that if such use of property rights can provide a
foundation for charitable deductions under the income tax, it must also
constitute the foundation for a taxable gift.6 4 Furthermore, the dissent
disagreed with the district court decision in Johnson,6 5 and determined that
an interest-free loan might well deplete the taxpayer's taxable estate at
death. 66 In support of this argument, Judge Simpson noted the situation in
which the taxpayer/creditor dies before the date specified for repayment of
principal. 67 Under such circumstances, the amount includable in his estate
becomes not the face value of the note, but its value discounted to date of
68
death.
Although the majority analysis in Crown is subject to criticism, 69 it is
submitted that the policy considerations involved provide a viable basis for
supporting the instant decision. In this regard, the ramifications of a
decision holding intrafamily transfers subject to gift tax would create
in Blackburn was determined in relation to real estate loans executed in the locality of
the transfer. G. H. Blackburn, 20 T.C. 204, 207 (1952). See notes 18-22 and
accompanying text supra. The dissent noted that Blackburn permitted valuation at a
figure of four percent per annum. 67 T.C. at 1068 (Simpson, J., dissenting). However,
the dissent failed to mention that the Blackburn court determined such value to be the
fair market rate of real estate loans as compared to the average prime rate calculated
over the period of time involved. 20 T.C. at 207. The Crown court made reference to the
average prime rate over the period of time involved when it evaluated the position of
the Commissioner. 67 T.C. at 1061. In addition, the other authorities cited by the

dissent involved the valuation of an annuity interest where the applicable rate to be

imposed upon such transfers is set forth by the regulations. 67 T.C. at 1068-69, citing
Estate of Koert Bartman, 10 T.C. 1075 (1949); Estate of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T.C. 543
(1943). Accordingly, it is submitted that as the regulations fail to provide a uniform
rate for other types of transfers, the dissent should have set forth a uniform standard
to be utilized, rather than leave the determination of interest rates to the
Commissioner without having provided any guidelines. A similar position was
enunciated by one commentator in reviewing Revenue Ruling 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408.
Note, Gift Tax: Parent'sInterest Free Loan to Son's CorporationHeld Taxable Gift, 4
TAX ADVISOR 175, 176 (1973). The commentator considered deficiencies to exist in the
ruling's failure to cover understated interest, failure to provide a safe-haven, and
failure to specify an interest-imputing rate. Id. at 176.
63. 67 T.C. at 1069 (Simpson, J., dissenting). See note 45 supra. See also Duhl &
Fine, supra note 45, at 34.
64. 67 T.C. at 1069 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
65. Id. For a discussion of Johnson, see notes 23-30 and accompanying text
supra.

66. 67 T.C. at 1069-70 (Simpson, J., dissenting).

67. Id.
68. 67 T.C. at 1069-70 (Simpson, J., dissenting). This argument may be
demonstrated by reference to the value assigned to such property for estate tax
purposes. The regulations provide:
The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross estate ... is
The fair market
its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death ....
value is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell
and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.
Treas. Reg. §20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367. Accordingly, if the notes
involved were outstanding at date of death, a considerably lower value would be
placed on them than if they included a provision for accrued interest.
69. See notes 77-90 and accompanying text infra.
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enormous problems of valuation and administration.' Moreover, specific
guidelines and regulations would need to be promulgated in order to prevent
increased litigation.71 In addition, such a holding could possibly be
interpreted as creating an obligation upon taxpayers to credit each use of
the family car, television, or summer home to a gift account for a value equal
to the fair market rental value of the item. Then, at the end of the first
73
calendar quarter when the account exceeded the section 2503(b) exclusion,
if available, 74 a gift tax return would be due.7 5 Since it is not the function of
the judiciary to enact regulations 7 6 it is accordingly submitted that from a
policy standpoint the court's action was sound.
The most serious objection to the majority's opinion is its failure to
recognize the distinctions between the treatment of interest-free loans under
the gift tax provisions of the Code and their treatment under the income tax
provisions. Chapter twelve of subtitle B of the Code provides the specific
statutory authority for the calculation and imposition of the gift tax. 7 7 In
70. Linett, supra note 51, at 372. In discussing valuation and the process involved
it has been stated:
Valuation questions are primarily factual. Undoubtedly, most such controversies
are settled in the administrative process, although litigation involving valuation
is certainly common. As may be expected, the final determination of value often
represents a compromise between the figure asserted by the taxpayer and that of
the Commissioner. In general, any factor that reasonably would be considered in
determining whether property should be purchased or sold is relevant in
determining fair market value for estate tax purposes. Such factors include
income yield, appraisals, sales prices of similar property near the time of death,
bids made for the property and general economic conditions.

R.

G. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 4-4 (3d
ed. 1974) (footnotes omitted). If each such family transfer were to be subjected to the
above procedures, it is questionable whether the courts or the Service would be able to
absorb the additional workloads. See also Bosland, Tax Valuation by Compromise, 19
TAX L. REV. 77 (1963).
71. 67 T.C. at 1065-66.
72. See Note, supra note 62, at 176. The regulations provide for valuing an item at
the price at which that item would be sold at retail. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1, T.D. 6826,
1965-2 C.B. 369.
73. See I.R.C. § 2503(b). The annual exclusion provides that "the first $3,000 of
STEPHENS,

gifts made to any one donee .

.

. except gifts of future interests in property .

.

. is

excluded in determining the total amount of gifts for a calendar quarter." Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2503-2(a), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544. The $3,000 is an aggregate exclusion which
is applied until such time as the total amount of gifts exceeds the excludible amount.
I.R.C. § 2503(b).
74. It should be noted that the exclusion is not applied to transfers of future
interests. I.R.C. § 2503(b). Additionally, while the exclusion is available in the
intrafamily transfer between husband and wife, id., § 2523(a) of the Code provides a
deduction for certain intraspousal transfers. Id. at § 2523(a). Subject to certain
limitations, that section provides in relevant part:
Where a donor who is a citizen or resident transfers during the calendar quarter
by gift an interest in property to a donee who at the time of the gift is the donor's
spouse, there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing taxable gifts for the
calendar quarter an amount with respect to such interest equal to its value.
Id.
75. Treas. Reg. §25.6019-1, T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544.
76. See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Lewis v. United States,
92 U.S. 618 (1875); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869).
77. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2501-2622.
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contrast, subtitle A provides the authority for the taxing of income in its
most general sense, with no provisions therein that permit the taxing of
78
transfers for less than adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
Although it is possible for a single transaction to be subject to more than
one tax under multiple subtitles, it is suggested that the court's failure to
recognize the limited applicability of each subtitle is a shortcoming of the
majority opinion.7 9
It is submitted that the court's summary incorporation of the Johnson
rationale presents another basis for criticism of the Crown decision. 0 The
majority in the instant case, as the Johnson court before it, failed to address
the threshold inquiry of the gift tax statute: was there a "transfer of
property"? 81 Congress intended that the term "property" reach "every
species of right or interest protected by law and having exchangeable
value. '82 Accordingly, since the right to use money is susceptible of present
value calculation,83 the loans in the case sub judice should have been
classified as property by the Crown court.
The regulations provide that a transfer occurs when the "donor has so
parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no power to change [the
property's] disposition. 81 4 Arguably, it could be maintained that as a portion
of the loans involved were executed on a demand basis, 85 the grantor never
parted with the statutorily required dominion and control.86 It is suggested,
however, that a grantor may be deemed, at the end of each calendar quarter,
to have parted with dominion and control of the loans which are then
outstanding. 87 It is therefore submitted that the result in Crown appears to
be contrary to the result obtained by a strict statutory interpretation.
78. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1-1564. See also Hooton, Gift Tax Analysis of nonInterest Bearing Loans, 54 TAXES 635 (1976).
79. Despite such an interpretation, it may be argued that the majority did
recognize the distinction when it stated: "The courts have uniformly rejected every
attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to subject the making of non-interest bearing

loans to income or gift taxes." 67 T.C. at 1064. Notwithstanding such a possibility, it
is submitted that such an inference seems unwarranted since the majority, after
making this statement, referred solely to income tax cases in support of its holding.

Id. at 1064-65. For a discussion of the income tax cases relied on by the majority, see
notes 33-45 supra.
80. See 67 T.C. at 1062-64.
81. See I.R.C. §2501; note 13 and accompanying text supra.
82. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 39 (1932); reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 496, 524. See note 14 supra.
83. E. Helfert, supra note 9, at 126-36. It is submitted that the ability to reduce a
negotiable instrument to a present value figure is evidence that an ascertainable
value in money or money's worth does exist.
84. Treas. Reg.'§25.2511-2(b), T.D. 7296, 1974-1 C.B. 255.
85. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
86. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-2(a), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544. See notes 13 & 14 and
accompanying text supra.
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a), T.D. 7394, 1976-1 C.B. 135. The Treasury
Regulations under § 482 provide that the Service is authorized to make allocations
that reflect an arm's-length interest rate in transactions between entities owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1), T.D.
6952, 1968-1 C.B. 224. See also Jenks, Treasury Regulations Under Section 482, 23
TAX LAW. 279 (1970).
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Moreover, it appears that the majority's reliance on section 482 income
tax cases was inappropriate.8 Section 482 is an income tax, rather than a
.gift tax, provision prohibiting certain manipulations of funds among related
entities. Furthermore, the Crown court ignored the fact that section 482 was
enacted as a result of the courts' failure to inhibit such manipulations.8 9 It is
accordingly submitted that the failure of the judiciary to address an income
tax question does not constitute sufficient authority for judicial avoidance of
a gift tax problem, particularly with the problems corrected by section 482
demanded rectification through congressional interventionf 0
In contravention of the purposes behind the income tax and gift tax
provisions, the holding in Crown permitted the transfer of the taxpayer's
right to earn income on his capital to his children, with no value in "money
or money's worth" exchanged in receipt of that right 9l and without any gift
tax consequences. 92 In addition, Crown fails to indicate the taxable outcome
in the event that a family member/borrower makes an investment that goes
sour. Whether a parent would force a child into bankruptcy, or forgive the
indebtedness and cause a realization of the entire principal of the loan by
93
"both" the income and gift tax laws, is worthy of consideration.
For the estate planner, the Crown decision may stimulate reevaluation
of the desirability of grantor trusts.9 4 Both the borrower of the interest-free
88. See 67 T.C. at 1064-65. See also B. Foreman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d
1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v.
Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940); Smith-Bridgeman & Co. v. Commissioner,
16 T.C. 287 (1951); Text accompanying notes 33-45 supra.
89. See 67 T.C. at 1064. Section 482 was enacted in response to the practice
engaged in by related organizations of transferring assets for unrealistically high
sales prices and extending installment credit without charging interest. Nauheim,
supra note 45, at 108.
90. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text supra.
91. While the transfer was made to the various trusts, the children were the
beneficiaries of such trusts and accordingly received any benefits from such transfers.
67 T.C. at 1060.
92. Id. at 1065.
93. In this hypothetical situation, if the parent discharges the indebtedness, the
doctrine of forgiveness of indebtedness would cause the entire amount due and owing
to be included within the gross income of the child. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). This doctrine
was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284
U.S. 1 (1931). Additionally, since the note receivable may be considered property and
the discharge of the indebtedness may be a transfer, § 2501 would require the
imposition of a gift tax (for purposes of this hypothetical the section 2503(b) exclusion
is disregarded). I.R.C. § 2501(a).
One commentator has enumerated the essential attributes which are
necessary to effectuate a proper interest-free intrafamily loan. See Burke, Interest-Free
Loans - A Valuable Family Tax Planning Tool? 48 TAXES 137 (1970). First, the
lender must retain no control, either implicit or explicit, over the principal. Id. at 138.
A failure to incorporate this feature may cause the Commissioner to succeed in an
attempt to apply the assignment of income rule. Id. Second, the loan must be 1)
evidenced in writing, and 2) contain adequate provisions for repayment. Id. at 139.
The incorporation of these factors will help to overcome the presumption that
transfers without consideration between parents and children are gifts. Id. Third,
there must be an explicit provision evidencing the intent of the parties that no interest
is to exist on the debt. Id.
94. A grantor trust is defined, for purposes of this note, as a trust which contains
implicit or explicit provisions in the governing instrument that cause the grantor or
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loan and the beneficiary of the grantor trust are entitled to the income
generated by the respective principal or corpus.9 5 However, sections 671-678
of the Code contain provisions that tax the income generated by a trust to
the grantor or another person in certain circumstances although he does not
receive the distribution of such income. 96 The use of an interest-free loan, on
the other hand, causes the borrowerto be taxed on the income generated by
to the technical conditions imposed under the
such funds without reference
97
grantor trust provisions.
An additional benefit in making an interest-free loan after Crown is that
no taxable transfer exists at the inception of the loan. 98 In contrast, the
Service may impose a gift tax under certain circumstances on the initial
transfer funding a grantor trust.99 The gift tax consequences after the
instant case definitely favor the interest-free loan since it is possible to have
a shifting of the income generated by such funds to a lower income tax
bracketed taxpayer, 1°° and the initial transfer will not constitute a taxable

another person to be treated as owner of all or a portion of the trust. When the grantor
or such other person is treated as owner, the income generated by the trust is taxed to
such person even though he does not receive a distribution from the trust. I.R.C.
§§ 671-678.
Some of the circumstances which may cause the grantor to be treated as
owner of a portion of the trust are:
(1) If the grantor has retained a reversionary interest in the trust, within
specified time limits (section 673);
(2) If the grantor or a non-adverse party has certain powers over the
beneficial interests under the trust (section 674);
(3) If certain administrative powers over the trust exist under which the
grantor can or does benefit (section 675);
(4) If the grantor or a non-adverse party has a power to revoke the trust or
return the corpus to the grantor (section 676); or
(5) If the grantor or a non-adverse party has the power to distribute income
to or for the benefit of the grantor or the grantor's spouse (section 677).
Treas. Reg. 1.671-1(a), T.D. 7148, 1971-2 C.B. 251.
95. For the beneficiary of a trust, this would necessarily depend upon the terms of
the trust instrument and the classification of the beneficiary under the normal rules of
trust taxation. See I.R.C. §§ 651-656.
96. See I.R.C. §§671-678; note 94 supra. See also Treas. Regs. 1.671-1.678, T.D.
6217, 1956-2 C.B. 336.

97. See Treas. Regs. 1.671-1.678, T.D. 6217, 1956-2 C.B. 336. The conditions

referred to consist of whatever limitations the grantor has incorporated into the
instrument at its inception. For a discussion of these limitations, see L. Van Geffen,
Tax Clinic - Interest Free Loans, 120 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY 75 (1965).
98. See notes 91 & 92 and accompanying text supra.
99. I.R.C. § 2501. In addition, § 2511 imposes a gift tax on the initial transfer into
a grantor trust. Id. § 2511. See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(e), T.D. 7296, 1974-1 C.B.
255. The other conditions for imposition of the gift tax are that the property is
transferred and that the transfer is complete within the terms of the statute. Id. See
notes 11-15, 81 & 82 and accompanying text supra.
100. By structuring a transaction as an interest-free loan, the lender avoids the
risk of being characterized as the owner of the interest income. Compare this with
I.R.C. § 673 which provides that a grantor will be treated as the owner of the trust
unless such power may not be exercised prior to the expiration of one of the three
relevant time frames. Id. Section 673(a) provides:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in which he
has a reversionary interest in either the corpus or the income therefrom if, as of
the inception of that portion of the trust, the interest will or may reasonably be

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/10

12

Stein: Federal Gift and Estate Tax - Interest-Fre Loans - Intrafamily In
1977-1978]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

event. 10 1 Recognizing that the Treasury and Congress sought to impose a
taxable result when a transfer falls within sections 671-678,102 it is
submitted that the judiciary should not permit an interest-free loan to be a
method to circumvent such taxes. Accordingly, it is anticipated that
10 3
Congress will act to impose a tax on such gratuitous transfers of property.
As a result of the approach taken by the Crown court, it will be the
responsibility of Congress to enact legislation that prevents the manipulation of funds within a family from being a tax-avoidance technique. Until
that time, however, the interest-free, intrafamily loan remains a viable
vehicle for the practitioner to best serve the needs of his client.
Lee H. Stein

expected to take effect in possession or enjoyment within 10 years commencing
with the date of the transfer of that portion of the trust.
I.R.C. §673(a).
101. See I.R.C. § 2511. As the lender has a legal right to the borrowed funds, he
would not be considered to have parted with dominion and control. Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2511-2(a), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 565.
102. See I.R.C. §§671-678.
103. For a discussion of some of the possible solutions to the taxation of interestfree loans, see Schlifke, Taxing as Income the Receipt of Interest Free Loans, 33 U.
CHi. L. REV. 346 (1966); Note, Intra-Family Income Splitting: The Luxury of
Nonsupport Trust, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 166 (1973).
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